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ABSTRACT 
Contemporary Islam presents Europe in particular with a political and moral challenge: 
Moderate-progressive Muslims and radical fundamentalist Muslims present differing 
visions of the relation of politics and religion and, consequently, differing interpretations 
of freedom of expression.  There is evident public concern about Western “political 
correctness,” when law or policy accommodates censorship of speech allegedly violating 
religious sensibilities.  Referring to the thought of philosopher Baruch Spinoza, and 
accounting for the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Universal Islamic 
Declaration of Human Rights, and various empirical studies on the religious convictions 
of Muslims, it is argued here that: (1) sovereign European state powers should be 
especially cautious of legal censorship of speech allegedly violating Muslim religious 
sensibilities; and (2) instead of legal moves to censorship, European states should defer to 
the principle of separation of religion and state (political authority). Further, a reasonable 
interpretation of Islamic jurisprudence allows that matters of religious difference may be 
engaged and resolved by appeal to private conscience and ethical judgment, rather than 
by appeal to public law per se.   In so far as they are representative of contemporary 1
scholarship, the interpretative positions of Ziad Elmarsafy, Jacques Derrida, and Nasr 
Abū Zayd are presented in illustration of this latter point.  2
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1 Introduction and Background 
“Daesh,” the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL, also known ISIS) has been defeated on 
the battlefields of Syria and Iraq. But, its jihadist remnants promise continuing terrorist action 
against Western powers and peoples.  In the wake of terror and political oppression in many 
Muslim-majority countries by no means homogenous in Islamic doctrine, Europe faces 
uncertainty about its own political culture due to the massive waves of refugees seeking asylum, 
prospective citizenship, and contested expectations about assimilation.  There is much that is 
ambiguous in this intercultural encounter.  Some years ago, political scientist Michael Dillon 
commented that, 
The refugee is a scandal for philosophy in that the refugee recalls the radical instability of 
meaning and the incalculability of the human.  The refugee is a scandal for politics also, 
however, in that the advent of the refugee is always a reproach to the formation of the 
political order of subjectivity which necessarily gives rise to the refugee.  The scandal is 
intensified for any politics of identity which presupposes that the goal of politics is the 
realization of sovereign identity.  3
This scandal, at once philosophical and political, is front and center in European politics today. 
On the one hand, Europe is experiencing a strident nationalist and populist appeal (e.g., in the 
Netherlands, France, Germany, Austria, Britain, Italy), national electoral politics pitting political 
parties against each other according to varying interpretations of the national interest.  On the 
other hand, the waves of refugees crossing the Mediterranean into the continent out of North 
Africa and Turkey entail a European encounter with “Islam” that the continent has not seen since 
the removal of the Moors and the last political incursion of the Ottoman Empire.  In this 
empirical sense of contraposition, but in a philosophical sense also as expressed, e.g., by French 
philosopher Jacques Derrida,  Europe is therefore unsure of its identity and its destiny.  Both this 4
identity and this destiny cannot be settled except with reference to this encounter with Islam. 
Europe’s identity and its destiny are understood historically, of course, to have been formed in 
the modern era according to the “humanist” and “secular” ideals of the Renaissance (normally 
dated 14th-17th centuries) and the principles of “liberal” political philosophy championed in the 
Enlightenment (18th century). Both secular-humanist philosophy and liberal-republican politics 
contributed to the configuration of the modern political order. That is to say, since the end of 
the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), modern political philosophy has 
been clearly motivated against the Christian religious (temporal and spiritual) authority that 
long dominated the behavior of the European states of the Middle Ages. Recently, however, 
scholars in the history of ideas have sought more precision in the understanding of the 
Enlightenment (often associated with the French philosophes in particular—D’Alembert, 
Diderot, Condorcet, Voltaire, etc.). Hence, there is recent attention to, and explicitly novel 
identification of, the so-called “radical Enlightenment,” as articulated convincingly by 
Jonathan Israel.    5
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2 Spinoza’s Counsel 
The “radicality” of thought associated with the concept of the radical Enlightenment is here 
associated with the philosophy of Baruch (Benedict) Spinoza (1632-1677), and understood to be 
“foundational” to the ethos of the subsequent French Enlightenment.  I, therefore, turn to 
Spinoza’s thought for its counsel in the present circumstance of Europe’s encounter with Islam. 
It is well known, as Spinoza scholar Steven Nadler puts it, that Spinoza’s thought contributed 
formatively to “a strongly democratic political thought and a deep critique of the pretensions of 
Scripture and sectarian religion.”   It is in his critique of sectarian religion, and in his insistence 6
on the separation of the institutions of church and state, that Spinoza has his place as the 
principal philosophical authority of the radical Enlightenment.  This critique is especially to be 
found in Spinoza’s Theological-Political Treatise (1670). Hence, one may argue that this treatise 
speaks to today’s European disquietude about human rights, especially in a moment of mass 
migration and the entirely ambiguous status of the refugee vis-à-vis the sovereign state and the 
European union itself.   This is so especially for the refugee who self-identifies as Muslim. 7
The “Introduction” to the 2007 Cambridge edition of the Treatise informs us that, 
Spinoza “strove to reinforce individual liberty and freedom of expression by introducing, or 
rather further systematizing, a new type of political theory”—a theory issued as an exercise in 
“applied philosophy.”  Spinoza sought to preserve the individual’s “natural right of free reason 8
and judgment” against tyrannical abuse of sovereign authority, the latter occurring through 
usurpation of a right not abdicated precisely because it is inalienable.  Jonathan Israel argues that, 
“Spinoza and Spinozism were in fact the intellectual backbone of the European Radical 
Enlightenment everywhere,” marking “the most dramatic step towards secularization and 
rationalization in Europe’s history.”  Central to Spinoza’s “radical” enlightenment were 
Spinoza’s claims: (1) philosophical reason is the only true guide in human life; (2) no scripture 
or revelation can be authoritative.  Both claims are essential to democracy as the best form of 
government favoring equality and opposed to hierarchy present in political despotism.   Israel 9
asserts Spinoza was “the chief challenger of the fundamentals of revealed religion…and what 
was everywhere regarded …as divinely constituted political authority.”   In short, Spinoza 10
privileges equalitarian democracy over theocracy as a matter of philosophical reason.   
             
Jewish scholar Yirmiyahu Yovel characterizes Spinoza a modern philosopher whose 
“philosophical revolution anticipated major trends in European modernization, including 
secularization, biblical criticism, the rise of natural science, the Enlightenment, and the liberal-
democratic state.”  Spinoza’s philosophical commitment is to the authority of reason, not 11
revelation.  Spinoza’s Treatise thus expresses a grave concern for the harm done by religious 
dogma when enforced by the State: “Religious dogma comes to be enforced on everyone by 
force of law because the common people are persuaded by religious teachers that they should 
insist on doctrinal uniformity in the interests of their own and everyone else’s salvation and 
relationship to God.”   Force of law (i.e., positive law) is essential to the order of any political 12
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society, but only if assuming law adheres to and implements a defensible concept of justice.  In 
Chapter 16 of the Treatise, Spinoza discusses the foundation of the state, natural and civil rights, 
and the authority of the sovereign power.  In Chapter 19 Spinoza engages the difficult issue of 
the relation of politics and religion, specifically what authority the sovereign power may have “in 
sacred matters.”  In Chapter 20 Spinoza reasons that a “free state” allows everyone “to think 
what they wish and to say what they think.” (italics added)  It behooves us, then, to consider 
Spinoza’s argument primarily as given in Chapter 20 of the Treatise.     
              
Spinoza acknowledged the sovereign’s “civil jurisdiction,” but also its authority as guardian of 
“sacred matters,” even as “interpreter” of divine law.  As the title of Chapter 19 makes clear: 13
“the external cult of religion must be consistent with the stability of the state if we wish to obey 
God rightly.”  Aware of the consequences of religiously motivated warfare, such as occurred 
during the Thirty Years War, Spinoza sought “to demonstrate that religious worship and pious 
conduct must be accommodated to the peace and interests of the state and consequently must be 
determined by the sovereign authorities alone.”   Freedom of expression of religious belief is 14
rightfully exercised only as sanctioned by the sovereign power in relation to the desideratum of 
peace (stability) within the established political order.  Spinoza distinguished “formal religious 
worship” and “piety itself or private worship of God or the means by which the mind is 
internally directed wholeheartedly to revere God.”   He was concerned not with the private 15
observance of the rituals of faith, but with what occurs as the public practice of religion.  The 
doctrine of separation of religion and state is foundational for this distinction.  Piety has its place 
in the State as a private matter.  But, Spinoza argued, “any pious act that one can perform for a 
neighbor becomes impious if it entails harm to the whole state, and, conversely, there can be no 
impious act against a neighbor which is not to be deemed pious if done for the preservation of 
the state.”   Thus, religious observance must conduce to the preservation of civil society (which 16
is not to say preservation of the “cult of religion.”          
              
Spinoza recognized individual freedom of religious practice, individual piety; but, he was also 
clear that men acting as private men, and not as officials of state, must take care not to “make a 
seditious attempt themselves to champion divine right” as if they have the authority to decree as 
does the sovereign.   It may seem contradictory for Spinoza to proceed in Chapter 20 of the 17
Treatise to argue, in “a free state” everyone is permitted “to think” what he wishes and “to say” 
what he thinks.   But, his argument is to be assessed in relation to his remarks in Chapter 19:  It 18
is a matter of natural right that one thinks freely and makes his own judgments about any matter 
whatsoever, Spinoza asserted.  This right to think and to judge cannot be transferred to the State 
power. Any government that seeks to compel transfer of this natural right acts oppressively, thus 
contrary to public justice that preserves this right.  Every individual retains full control over his 
thinking and his judgment while a member of a civil society. But, his or her actions—which 
proceed from his thinking and his judgment—are subject to restriction by the sovereign, as 
demanded by public interest and public justice.  Qua private citizen any person may think and 
say as s/he wishes, bearing in mind s/he does not think or speak as an official of the State.  Such 
private speech is by no means to be censored.        
             
"4
International Journal of Political Theory      Emertec R&D 
| Vol 3., No. 1 2018 | ISSN: 2371-3321                                                                   www.emertec.ca
If speech is to be restricted, however, it is warranted, Spinoza allows, only when an individual 
speaks “[1] by trickery or [2] in anger or [3] from hatred or [4] with the intention of introducing 
some alteration in the state on [his] own initiative.”  Spinoza provides a pertinent distinction: 
…suppose someone shows a law to be contrary to sound reason and voices the opinion 
that it should be repealed.  If at the same time they submit their view to the sovereign 
power and in the meantime do nothing contrary to what the law commands, they surely 
deserve well of their country, as every good citizen does.  If on the other hand, they make 
use of this freedom to accuse the magistrate of wrongdoing and render him odious to the 
common people or make a seditious attempt to abolish the law against the magistrate’s 
will, then they are nothing more than agitators and rebels.  19
Spinoza’s two conditional propositions here concern a proper relation of individual (natural) 
right to sovereign authority: “…the individual may say and teach what he thinks without 
infringing the right and authority of the sovereign power, that is, without disturbing the stability 
of the state.  The key is to leave decisions about any kind of action to the sovereign powers and 
do nothing contrary to what he himself judges best and publicly expresses.”   The operative 20
assumption is that (a) speaking one’s mind and (b) teaching what one thinks does not infringe on 
the right and authority of the sovereign and (c) does not, for that reason, disturb the stability of 
the state.  Taking action that amounts to sedition is not included in the natural right of speaking 
one’s mind; it is prohibited as a matter of public justice. 
3 Engaging Islam: Elmarsafy and Derrida 
Spinoza’s counsel on the relation of sovereign authority and religious dogma is surely pertinent 
to Europe’s historical engagement with Islam and is, therefore, entirely salient for any 
contemporary evaluation of the present political order as it relates to Europe’s current encounter 
with Islam. Important to the present European disquietude is Ziad Elmarsafy’s engagement of the 
Qur’ān in terms of Enlightenment discourse, and thus in relation to the radical Enlightenment 
perspective initiated by Spinoza.  Elmarsafy’s conception of “the Enlightenment Qur’ān” draws 
our attention (a) to the politics that belongs to the very act of translation of this text and (b) to the 
construction (i.e., constructed representations) of Islam according to this politics of translation.  21
Elmarsafy reminds of history as “invention.” Hence, the historiography of Islam is one of 
“construction,” European interpretations of Islamic faith and practice having their constructed 
discourses, all according to various motivations—religious, moral, social, cultural, and political. 
In undertaking his study of the European translation of Islamic texts, Elmarsafy identifies 
himself as “culturally Muslim,” but one who is “uncomfortable with homogeneity of any kind.” 
He is, therefore, appreciative of “difference” and “plurality”—ideas of interpersonal and 
intercultural relation he finds (1) supported by the text of the Qur’ān itself  and (2) salient to 22
inter-faith dialogue as Europe today must work through the “production” and “reproduction” of 
its histories concerning the relation of self (e.g., European Christian, European nationalist) and 
other (e.g., the refugee/immigrant as Muslim and not European in the classical historical sense). 
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Thus, in particular today in Europe, the relation of “Christian” (Roman Catholic, Protestant, 
Anglican, Greek/Russian Orthodox, Coptic) to “Muslim” (Sunni, Shi’a, Sufi, Salafist, Jihadist) 
elicits the basic question about the status of the refugee of today, whose identity is framed 
religiously first and foremost.           23
             
The politics of translation in the 17th century, Elmarsafy points out, is one in which the Arabic 
text will find its expression into the Latin (the translation by Ludovico Marachi in 1698) and 
later into English (the translation by George Sale in 1734), but not without a committed 
“painstaking refutation” in the case of the former translation and “copious commentary” in the 
case of the latter translation, in relation to the then extant exegesis of that same text.  Presumably, 
these hermeneutic moves are consistent with: (a) the Christian prejudices (Roman Catholic or 
Protestant) of the translator; (b) inspiration from the politics of Rome’s Catholic 
“Reformation” (i.e., the “institutional” context of “counter-reformation” to the emergent 
Protestant faith and official declarations of what counts as “heresy” in contrast to Catholic 
“orthodoxy”); or (c) in the case of the translation of the Qur’ān into English, an intellectual 
commitment to the “republic of letters” inspiring the liberal politics of the day that sought to 
diminish the spiritual and temporal authority of the Church of Rome.     
              
Evidently, the presentation of the work of religious “scholarship” in Latin for a European 
audience at once (1) introduces a foreign scripture and (2) repudiates its religious validity, 
thereby (3) alienating the doctrinally “Christian” reader from whatever religiosity (legal, moral, 
spiritual) might otherwise be absorbed from this ostensibly “revealed” and, therefore, 
“authoritative” scriptural text. The politics of translation thus presents itself initially as a polemic 
against Islam, despite the seemingly defensible exegesis of Islamic doctrine. This polemic yet 
resounds in the European encounter with the history of Islamic scholarship and, more pressing, 
the current encounter with immigrant Muslims seeking to practice their faith according to 
sectarian interpretations of Islamic doctrine, the latter manifestly subject to various degrees of 
inter-sectarian intolerance and antipathy.  For Elmarsafy, the task for the present, then, is to 
consider an appropriate ethical response to the contemporary politics of estrangement (whether 
that of polemics or apologetics, both having roots in a history of invention/construction).  He 
seeks an ethics that recalls the opportunity vouchsafed by a comportment of “hospitality,” thus 
one of sympathy between “self” and “other” that is asserted against the images of self and other 
represented in the comportment of antipathy.  In this regard, Elmarsafy links to Derrida’s 
concern for the relation of European to “the other,” to s/he who is manifestly “stranger” and calls 
forth one’s “hospitality.” 
4 Derrida and the Call to Hospitality 
Derrida, of course, opined on the issue of European identity as well as the significance of an act 
of hospitality towards what is foreign, strange—l’étranger (“the stranger,” “the foreigner,” xenos 
in the classical Greek, thus ‘xenophobia’).  In a seminar from 10 January 1996, Derrida 
commented on one manner of perception of the foreigner (in Plato’s Theaetetus and The 
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Statesman), as someone “mad” (manikos), his manner of speaking giving the opportunity to 
others to look upon him as “deranged.”   Yet, in Plato’s The Statesman the stranger is “warmly 24
welcomed, apparently, he is given asylum, he has the right to hospitality…”  Those are two 25
concepts pertinent to the present disquietude in Europe.  Of course, Derrida observes, “the 
foreigner is first of all foreign to the legal language in which the duty of hospitality is 
formulated, the right to asylum, its limits, norms, policing, etc.  He has to ask for hospitality in a 
language which by definition is not his own…”  And, Derrida clarifies, starkly stating the 26
import of the statement: “that’s the first act of violence” against the foreigner: 
That is where the question of hospitality begins: must we ask the foreigner to understand 
us, to speak our language, in all the senses of this term, in all its possible extensions, 
before being able and so as to be able to welcome him into our country?  If he was 
already speaking our language, with all that implies, if we already shared everything that 
is shared with a language, would the foreigner still be a foreigner and could we speak of 
asylum or hospitality in regard to him?  This is the paradox…  27
Derrida’s reference to the foreigner’s “language” means the foreigner is no barbarian to be 
excluded because he is either “savage” or “heterogenous” in his self-presentation.  Having a 
language, “the foreigner doesn’t only have a right, he or she also has, reciprocally, 
obligations…”  The relation of right (droit) to duty (devoir) presupposes a civil pact—a pact 28
within which the foreigner is received first “by asking his name; you enjoin him to state and to 
guarantee his identity,” thus the initiation of a legal relation.  “In telling me what your name is, in 
responding to this request, you are responding on your own behalf, you are responsible before 
the law and before your hosts, you are a subject in law.”   Engaged neither as barbarian without 29
language nor as outlaw (anomon), the foreigner is thus to be received as one claiming his or her 
right to hospitality, and s/he thereby also lays claim to a reciprocal obligation.  It is within this 
concept of civil pact that both foreigner and native citizen are called to forge their identity, both 
individual and collective.  The problem of collective identity, of course, is the problem of 
integration and assimilation, whether the individual accepts the political culture of the host or 
instead seeks to subvert it by contraposing himself such as is argued is happening today with the 
influx of Muslims transporting with them sectarian beliefs and practices.     
              
One may, thus, consider, the political present of Europe more or less as Derrida commented:  “…
I believe that Europe is a confused concept and a common name for very diverse things: the 
relationship of the State to religion is not the same in France, Germany, England, Italy, and 
nevertheless, there is something common to all the European States, which is a certain principle 
of separation between the State and religion, without scorn for religion.”   Separation of State 30
and religion is, of course, a championed principle of modern political philosophy and 
incorporated in the establishment of the constitutional discourse of the modern nation-state that 
is denominated “republic” (i.e., res publica).  When that principle is challenged at the limits of 
encounter between religious and political discourse, however, then a crisis of identity presents 
itself—how far to recognize the legitimacy of religious sensibility within the republic; how far to 
insist on the freedom of expression that may “offend” religious sensibility; whether to insist on 
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legal (as opposed to moral) limits on expression; whether to admit the State’s sovereignty over 
sacred matters insofar as the State upholds public justice over against private claims to justice (as 
we see engaged by Spinoza).  This is now an issue center-stage in the European scene of political 
and religious contestation even as it is current elsewhere in the setting of Muslim-majority 
countries.             
              
Europeans are obviously gripped by fear of the immigrant Muslim, of his “values” and 
“disvalues” deriving from the Qur’ān and the Sunna (the tradition of sayings and deeds of the 
prophet Muhammad).  Europe’s fear is motivated by what has been called “the great danger of 
Islamic terrorism,”  and the unsettling prospect of a “multicultural” Europe that is in fact not a 31
“melting pot” of convergence and coalescence but instead one of restrained contact and uneasy 
(even hostile) co-existence. The fear is that the “Greco-Roman-Christian-liberal” democratic 
political order of the past and present will be reshaped prospectively through “Islamization” 
rather than assimilation of Muslim immigrants into the liberal order.   At issue here is a question 32
Mustapha Chérif raised with Derrida in a discussion of the relation of Islam and the West: “…
whereas it is very difficult to learn how to live, and there is no convincing model, rather only 
disappointing and worrying ones, why this aggressiveness toward Islam, why must we all be 
Westernized, Europeanized, Americanized, to conform to progress, and thus appear to be 
civilized?”  33
Derrida’s response is instructive: “…I believe that it is not at all a comment against religion to 
say this; on the contrary, it is out of respect for religion that we must dissociate things and that 
we must cease to lead politics in the name of religion, or under the authority of religion, or 
sometimes under the authority of religious authorities themselves.”   Derrida’s statement here is 34
consistent with that of Spinoza. The presupposition here, of course, is that anyone having 
religious convictions, including in the context of the discussion about Muslims emigrating to 
European countries and seeking citizenship therein, are free to maintain their religious 
convictions but without seeking to “lead politics” in the name of Islam, or “under the authority” 
of Islam, or even “under the authority” of Islamic religious authorities—the latter to include here 
those recognized locally as “imams” and those more institutionally located within Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam with titles of rank such as “mufti” and “ayatollah.”  But, of course, the question—
from the views of Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic morality/ethics that influence the political 
judgments of adherent Muslims—is: whether such religious “authority” can be disengaged 
readily from a Muslim’s sense of political right (droit) and political duty (devoir) as determined 
by his or her religious conviction. 
5 Interpreting Civil Rights and Duties: Assimilation vs. Islamization 
Consider: It has been argued that, “mass Muslim immigration [e.g., into Europe] and the 
importation of sectarianism [both Sunni and Shi’a] unfortunately inherent in Islamic doctrine, 
undermine even more significantly…noble principles of ‘public good.’”   For many Europeans 35
that proposition is reasonably defensible, given the extant empirical evidence of radical Islamic 
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pronouncements of doctrine and terrorist actions that manifest themselves in the public domain 
often against what Europeans take to be the moral and political principles that govern their 
interactions as citizens committed to a public good, that separates religion and State.  Europe’s 
fear of the “radical-fundamentalist creed” of Muslim Salafists (those otherwise denominated 
militant “jihadists”) in particular is evident.  But, there is also concern about “moderate” Islam, 
interpreted by some as quietly advancing an agenda of “Islamization” of Europe—the quiet 
transformation of Europe into “Eurabia.”   Not surprisingly, then, some argue, “The chief threat 36
to free speech today comes from a combination of radical Islamic censorship and Western 
political correctness,” even though historically democracy is underpinned by the principle of free 
speech and reasoned criticism.   Of concern here, for example, is action undertaken in 2010 by 37
the UN Human Rights Council, Resolution No. 16/18 concerning “defamation of religion,” 
interpreted by some Muslims to mean outlawing “blasphemy” as such—even though there is 
ample reason conceptually, morally, and legally to distinguish defamation and blasphemy relative 
to precisely “who” is covered by the scope of the category.       
              
Writing on freedom of expression in relation to Spinoza’s thought, Roger Hearst remarks: 
“Political theory, being derived from knowledge [i.e., Reason] is, therefore, independent of 
Scripture [as the text of Revelation].  Reason is absolutely free to conceive of objects, such as the 
State, as it desires and without respect to Scriptural dogma.”  On this ground of reason, the 38
social contract within which a person commits himself to civil society, does not install an 
absolute sovereign such as religion might countenance.  Clearly, the political hope of a greater 39
good does not equate to the metaphysical hope that informs theistic belief, even as the fear of 
some greater evil cannot be that proper to theistic belief as expressed in eschatology.  Hence, 
religious authority cannot defensibly command a citizen’s absolute allegiance in view of a 
doctrine concerning “the afterlife,” even as religious authority cannot defensibly superintend the 
individual citizen’s rationality expressed freely in the present life in his thoughts and speech. A 
citizen’s commitment to the authority of reason, in contrast to the presumed authority of 
revelation, is in this sense reasonably unflinching in the setting of the modern liberal democratic 
order.              
              
Concerns about the relation of sovereign to individual freedoms in the setting of Europe are 
reasonably evident in the case of contemporary expressions of Islamic belief.  This is so for those 
nation-states that today have either a Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority population, but 
especially those self-identifying as liberal democracies in actuality or in intention.  There are, of 
course, Islamic scholars who have engaged the question of the relation of human rights to 
Islamic law,  even as the United Nations community has debated the issue of free speech and 40
“Islamophobia” (incorrectly equated to anti-Semitism in kind of discrimination—Islam itself is 
not a race or ethnicity as such).   Two groups, Human Rights First and the Muslim Public 41
Affairs Council counter efforts to criminalize free speech, arguing that,  “Countless incidents 
show that when governments or religious movements seek to punish offences in the name of 
combating religious bigotry, violence then ensues and real violations of human rights are 
perpetrated against targeted individuals.”            42
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The above stated argument is consequentialist in form—so long as the consequences of violence 
ensue, criminalization of free speech should not occur—and not a proposition that appeals as a 
matter of principle to civil liberty per se. Notwithstanding, it is clear from reports from 
international inter-governmental (IIGOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well 
as from any number of media reports, that governmental practices in contemporary Muslim-
majority states raise questions about their commitment to human rights.  From the European 
perspective at issue are fundamental rights stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).   
             
The UDHR recognizes “equal and inalienable rights” as “the foundation of freedom, justice and 
peace,” our contemporary world one “in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and 
belief…”  The right to freedom of expression is essential, “if man is not compelled to have 43
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.”  This right proceeds from 
a human’s natural endowment “with reason and conscience,” the basis of an individual’s moral 
conduct towards others.  Hence, Article 18 of the UDHR stipulates: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion…” Spinoza in his day and Derrida in our day utter 
the same.  Consistent with this statement, Article 19 specifies: “Everyone has the right to 
freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without 
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and 
regardless of frontiers.”  Hence, the basic right to freedom of expression is not limited to what 
means of expression an individual may access within his/her territorial nation-state.  S/he may 
exercise this right and access numerous means of expression by right internationally, despite 
legal recognition of a sovereign capacity for restriction in a given nation-state (i.e., legal 
limitation for various stipulated public interest concerns).       
              
While stipulating an individual’s basic human rights, the UDHR also recognizes corresponding 
“duties to the community.” Article 29(2) states, “In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, 
everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose 
of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the 
just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.” 
Important here is the reference to “democratic” society, the preferred form of government in the 
modern world, contrasting to other political orders (theocracy, monarchy, or aristocracy, or other 
version of rule by religious authority). Accordingly, it is expected, especially in the European 
body politic, that any restriction on a right to freedom of thought and expression must accord 
with the just requirements of modern liberal democracy.       
              
The ICCPR likewise holds, such rights “derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,” 
the protection of which is essential to an individual’s “right of self-determination.”   Article 44
18(1) stipulates, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion;” 
and, Article 19(1) specifies that even as, “Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without 
interference,” so Article 19(2) clarifies that, “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of 
expression,” including: “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, 
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other 
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media of his choice.”   As with the UDHR, ICCPR Article 19(2) allows for restriction (a) for 45
respect of the rights or reputations of others, or (b) for the protection of national security or 
public order, or of public health or morals.”  That accords with the Spinozan concern for political 
stability.             
              
The relation of these two expressions of international law and morality to Islamic doctrine is 
clearly, then, a pertinent concern in the setting of Europe’s present disquietude.  In September 
1981, at the International Conference on Human Rights in Islam, Muslim nations agreed on a 
Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights (UIDHR), notably prepared by the Islamic 
Council of Europe, affiliated with the Muslim World League, and eventually supported by the 
Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC).  This Declaration asserts, “Islam gave to 
mankind an ideal code of human rights fourteen centuries ago,” in which case “Human rights in 
Islam are firmly rooted in the belief that God, and God alone, is the Law Giver and the Source of 
all human rights.  Due to their Divine origin, no ruler, government, assembly or authority can 
curtail or violate in any way the human rights conferred by God, nor can they be surrendered.”  46
Hence, concerning the relation of divine revelation and human reason, the UIDHR asserts, 
“rationality by itself without the light of revelation from God can neither be a sure guide in the 
affairs of mankind nor provide spiritual nourishment to the human soul, and, knowing that the 
teachings of Islam represent the quintessence of Divine guidance in its final and perfect form, 
feel duty-bound to remind man of the high status and dignity bestowed on him by God.”  Here 
the UIDHR clearly privileges divine sovereignty over that of the popular sovereignty central to 
modern civil/democratic society.          
              
As with the UDHR, the UIDHR recognizes various freedoms, including (Article XII) the right to 
freedom of belief, thought and speech.  It is expected that this right is to be observed, in prospect, 
wherever a Muslim finds residence, to be sure, but consistent with his and her primary 
“obligation to establish an Islamic order.” (italics added)  The latter means governance by 
Islamic law (sharī‘ah), delivered “with the rules and the values set out in the Qur’ān and the 
Sunnah.”  The latter means, further, that “all public affairs” must be determined such that they 
“accord well with the [Islamic] Law and the public good” (the latter meaning the 
“objectives” [maqāsid] of the sharī‘ah and “public interest,” [maslahah]).  Any infringement of 
rights (as harm, darar), then, is to be evaluated and settled with reference to “appropriate 
remedial measures in accordance with the [Islamic] Law.”  Clearly, this is a contentious postulate 
of obligation contrary to the liberal democratic conception.       
              
Islamic jurisprudence scholar Mohammad H. Kamali clarifies, however, that “the bulk of Islamic 
teachings on speech and expression are of an ethical import, which are addressed to the 
conscience of the believers, and are not justiceable [sic] as such.”  This is an important point in 47
clarifying the propriety of any question of legal limits on speech acts in European countries that 
are presently Muslim-minority in status. It is, therefore, to be expected that, in recognizing a 
right to freedom of thought and belief there will very likely be relevant restriction from the 
government in a Muslim-majority country seeking to enable public legislation according to 
Islamic jurisprudence, even if the Constitution of that country allows otherwise for secular and 
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non-sectarian beliefs and behavior.  Thus, Article XII of the UIDHR stipulates, “Every person 
has the right to express his thoughts and beliefs so long as he remains within the limits 
prescribed by the [Islamic] Law [i.e., sharī‘ah].”  These limits may include means of 
dissemination, no barrier to such practice “provided it does not endanger the security of the 
society or the state and is confined within the limits imposed by the [Islamic] Law.”  The latter 
bar will be in effect if any one “shall hold in contempt or ridicule the religious beliefs of others 
or incite public hostility against them;” in which case, all individuals are obligated to show 
“respect for the religious feelings of others.”   Hence, according to the UIDHR, there should be 48
no violation of religious/Islamic sensibilities through one’s exercise of free speech, in which case 
it is not surprising that Muslim-majority countries have laws criminalizing such speech.   
             
But, as Kamali argues, properly interpreted, Islamic law “confines the scope of restrictions to 
measures necessary to repel an imminent danger to normal order in society,” and in that case 
“modern interpretations of seditious speech [fitnah] and conduct have done much to restrict the 
scope and substance of the freedom of expression.”   Kamali clarifies, “Seditious fitnah applies 49
to words and acts that incite dissension and controversy among people to such a degree that 
believers can no longer be distinguished from disbelievers.”   Thus, we have here an uneasy 50
disjunction in the prescriptions stipulated by the UIDHR and the UDHR. Clearly, the majority of 
the international community accepts the UDHR as a standard expressive of a common 
international morality if not international legality (as part of a declaratory tradition of 
international law).   The UIDHR is not so received to-date precisely because of provisions 51
contrary to the ethos of liberal democracy.  In contrast to these two declarations, the ICCPR does 
count as a legally binding treaty for its signatories (i.e., those who have signed and ratified the 
treaty and thereby given it municipal effect), even as it is a guiding standard for international 
morality.  This raises the question of the relation of Islamic law (sharī‘ah) to international law, 
the latter conceived as a set of principles deliberated and advanced primarily as Western 
jurisprudence without attention to theistic belief.  Nation-states in Europe have no inclination to 
permit Islamic law an authority internal to their States, while nonetheless allowing that 
international law (qua treaty law) does have municipal effect.  A.E. Mayer, among others, 
engages this problem in a recent work, even as there is ample periodical literature speaking to the 
question, i.e., to clarify fundamental issues of incompatibility relative to contemporary 
expectations for a democratic (not theocratic) structure of government.      52
              
For an analyst of the contemporary political scene such as Moataz ElFegiery, the conclusion 
subsequent to the “Arab Spring” is that “Arab revolutions have not yet managed to lead to 
democracies that are genuinely tolerant of individual human rights,” that “Islamists” have 
manifest an “ambivalent approach to human rights” that “reinforces cultural relativism and 
subverts universal human rights.”   The central problem is that, “Islamists have not abandoned 53
the objective of establishing Islamic states and a public order based on Shari‘ah (Islamic law).”  54
The latter recognizes no separation of religion and State or separation of the public and private 
such that religion is relegated to the domain of individual piety and action without interference 
by governmental authority.  Bassam Tibi, e.g., distinguishes Islamists who pursue violent jihād 
and those Muslims who pursue institutional reform. The latter group is ambiguous in its political 
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agenda insofar as, despite their non-violence, their perspective nonetheless accords with the 
UIDHR quest for an Islamic political order and the establishment of institutions of government 
organized according to sharī‘ah.           55
             
One may thereby consider related empirical evidence as to this scene of contestation.  Jan 
Michiel Otto’s comparative legal analysis of twelve Muslim countries provides some pertinent 
insights.   The conclusions are not encouraging for the early 21st century as one ponders the 56
continuing encounter between proponents of liberal democracy and Muslims advocating an 
Islamic political order,  notwithstanding calls from some prominent Muslim scholars for Islamic 57
reform.  Despite a clear perspective on government authority provided in a document such as 58
the UIDHR, Otto reminds that there is “a diversity of schools and interpretations of Islam,” that 
there are even historical “shifts in the interpretation of [sharī‘ah] as well as of a great variety in 
orientations both among and within national legal systems.”   A country like Iran, e.g., governed 59
according to a Shi‘a interpretation of Islam, once had a high-ranking cleric, Mirza Mohammad 
Hossein Na‘ini (b.1860; d. 1936), who (according to Otto’s report) rejected absolutism and 
defended constitutionalism at the time of the Iranian movement that led to the Constitutional 
Revolution of 1905-1911.  Sheikh Fazlolla Nuri, a religious scholar, opposed Na‘ini, arguing to 
the contrary that, “ideas of democracy and freedom, the reforms advocated by the 
constitutionalist, and the establishment of a parliament to enact legislation, were in contradiction 
with Islam.”   The same opposition occurs in some contemporary Muslim-majority nation-states 60
as they advance (1) the idea of liberal democracy as to some degree compatible with Islamic 
values, but with continuing ambivalence about the relation and priority of religious values to 
secular values, or (2) as the idea of an “Islamic State” clarifies that Islam is the religion of State 
and, therefore, Islamic doctrine constitutionally guides and structures deliberations about what is 
morally and legally permissible in the public order.        
             
The foregoing comments point to the question how tolerant a given nation-state is of legal 
pluralism—i.e., having various sources of law and morality conditioning individual behavior and 
governmental law, policy, and regulatory practice—as opposed to how essentialist is the 
interpretation of sharī‘ah.  The latter is the view according to which Islamic law is 
“unchangeable,” “binding,” “fixed,” and always to be “delineated” in that way by the recognized 
juridical authorities.   Fundamentalist, traditionalist, Islamist groups advance the latter 61
essentialist notion today; reformists advance the former pluralist perspective.  That said, 
however, even where there is a pluralist approach and a diminution of traditional jurisprudential 
authority of classical Islam, “Muslims seem to entrust key decisions in law and governance to the 
‘new’ legal institutions of the state, rather than to the old structures of [sharī‘ah] authority,” 
thereby eschewing religious leaders from having a “direct role in drafting a country’s 
constitution, writing national legislation, drafting new laws, determining foreign policy and 
international relations, or deciding how women dress in public or what is televised or published 
in newspapers.”             62
              
Obviously this can work positively to advance democratic values among Muslims, or it can work 
in the direction of insistence on an Islamic political order as laid out in the UIDHR, which links 
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to the classical Islamic concept of siyasa (“ruler’s power to make laws,” hence, “religious” 
government).  Hassan Hassan characterizes siyasa as a “pragmatic” principle: “The rise of 
Islamists…has revived a pragmatic form of Islamic jurisprudence that has been neglected for 
centuries: ‘siyasa shariyyah’, or Sharia-compliant realist governance, deals with politics, 
economics and law based on an overarching principle known as ‘maslaha’, or public interest.  In 
practice, siyasa shariyyah is often seen as in opposition to traditional jurisprudence.”  At once 63
opportune and problematic, however, the application of this principle lends itself to appeal to 
various schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanbali, Maliki, Hanafi, Shafi’i, Ja‘fari ), judicial 
outcomes allowing for change in legal authority and pernicious consequences (e.g., courts 
operating initially under the Maliki school sanctioning imprisonment for a capital offense, then 
the appeal level adjudication changing to the Hanafi school which permits the death penalty, as 
happened in a case in Abu Dhabi).   In the relation of sovereign to individual, the authority is 64
unmistakably clear: “The interests of the nation precede the interests of the individual.  Justice 
that safeguards the interests of the whole nation is preferable to that which safeguards the 
interests of the individual.”   This deference to collective interest diminishes individual right as 65
construed in the liberal political order of European democracies.      
              
Asifa Quraishi-Landes observes, “average Muslims presume that sharia corresponds only to the 
doctrinal rules of fiqh [i.e., “rules extrapolated from scripture by religious legal scholars 
articulating right conduct for Muslims”], leading them to believe that state legislation of fiqh 
rules is the only way their government can follow sharia.”   Despite the opportunity associated 66
with siyasa, “governance failures” in many Muslim countries, along with “people’s attachment to 
tradition in the form of symbols, structures and authorities of religion and custom,” contribute to 
this view of Islamic law.   The tendency in contemporary political Islam is to privilege a narrow 67
conception of fiqh over the pragmatism of siyasa. An approach to sharī‘ah based on siyasa is 
acceptable to reformist-minded Muslims, but it is the former approach that remains dominant in 
practice. Hence, freedom of expression (including here freedom of thought and speech) is 
constrained and restrained by Islamic conceptions of the public good favoring State authority 
over individual liberty.   It is, therefore, not surprising that Muslim-majority states implement 
prosecution for “public utterance of hurtful speech” (‘al-jahr bi’-sū’ min al-qawl’) through 
defamation laws, ‘hurtful’ here interpreted as harm to religious sentiments/sensibilities; even 
though, Kamali clarifies in reference to a typical verse such as the Qur’ān, al-Nisā’, 4:148: “The 
verse does not convey a command or a prohibition, nor any penalty for violation, rather it 
contains ethical advice and guidance.”   In fact, Kamali adds, the verse urges a person so 68
offended “and all concerned to be forgiving and forbearing, privately or in public, in anticipation 
of God’s unbounded mercy and reward.”  This ethical advice is lost on Islamic authorities as they 
seek retribution for perceived violations of religious sensibilities in free speech. 
5 Conclusion: A Commitment to “the Mandate of Philosophy” 
The prospect of Islamic reform, with respect for freedom of expression in thought and speech as 
a mandate of philosophy itself, as central to the contemporary debate, reminds of the case of the 
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Egyptian scholar Nasr Abū Zayd.   Abū Zayd is “the voice of an exile”  from his homeland, 69 70
charged as he was in 1993 as an apostate (indeed, as one whose writing expresses an “atrophy of 
religious conscience” and “intellectual terrorism”—itself a telling concept used by Islamic 
religious authorities appropriating the authority of the State).  Sometimes it is unclear whether an 
individual is properly accounted guilty of apostasy, blasphemy, or heresy, depending on the 
source of indictment and the venue of adjudication, since there tends to be a blurring of the three 
actions when alleged infidelity occurs.  Abū Zayd migrated to Holland, a voice in exile 71
championing freedom of thought, to be distinguished conceptually from freedom of speech per 
se. Fitting to Abū Zayd’s scholarly acclaim was his appointment as Ibn Rushd Professor at the 
University for Humanistics (Netherlands) and recognized in November 2005 as the recipient of 
the Ibn Rushd Award for Freedom of Thought.        
             
Abū Zayd understood that, “since the fifth century of the Islamic era, i.e., the twelfth century 
[C.E.], Islamic philosophy and Islamic theology as well as the creative philosophy of Sufism 
have been gradually marginalized” consequent to a reduction of Islam to “the paradigm” of 
sharī‘a.  This paradigm dominates wherever it is asserted that the gates of ijtihād 72
(interpretation) are closed (e.g., closed since the 13th century), leaving little room for renovation 
in Islamic thought, including tolerance of varied interpretive approaches such as that undertaken 
by Abū Zayd.  It is this paradigm that, for Abū Zayd, “commits ‘ideological deception’ when it 
encounters reason with the dictum lā ijtihād fī mā fīhi nass (there is no personal reasoning in any 
matter covered by the religious text).”   During his time as Professor of Islamic and Arabic 73
Studies at Cairo University, Abū Zayd bemoaned the “siege mentality” and “intellectual 
stagnation” there, such that “To offer new explanations or interpretations of religion becomes a 
blasphemous act.”   Thus, innovation in contrast to conservative interpretation is automatically 74
suspect and rejected. Hence, we have extant “two ways of thinking,” he says: “The Islamists 
cling to the immutability of the past.  This attachment to the past appeals to those who find 
change and development threatening.  Intellectual free-thinkers such as I,” said Abū Zayd, “do 
not consider our Islamic heritage sacred in and of itself.”  It is in this intellectual attitude that 
Abū Zayd speaks for freedom of thought, even if it means advancing an interpretation of the 
religious texts that denies literal truth and allows an engagement of the scriptures as metaphor. 
That is a courageous approach to the Islamic texts that ought not be prohibited in European states 
through legal censorship of free speech on the grounds that religious sensibilities of Muslims are 
violated.  Genuinely reformist voices surely do not countenance such prohibition, 
notwithstanding uncertainty associated with the UIDHR.       
              
For the present and for the foreseeable future, it seems, we are immersed in this irreconcilable 
tension between (1) those who adhere to the immutability of the past, such as given in Islamic 
scripture and tradition, and (2) those who advance the mandate of philosophy, to live the 
examined life that since Socrates questions ancestral custom and the authority of tradition, 
including the traditions of religious authority.  So long as arguments for freedom of thought and 
speech are ignored in the contemporary present of (a) rival religious belief and (b) the 
contraposition of (i) government based on religious authority and (ii) government based on 
principles of liberty, the contemporary world order will see continuing conflict to the detriment 
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of individual liberties.  Contemporary Europe is now a case in point.  Even so, a philosopher 
such as Spinoza speaks with authority as philosophical counsel to today’s theologico-political 
disquiet: “…the state is never safer than when piety and religion are taken to consist solely in the 
practice of charity and justice, when the right of the sovereign authorities, whether in sacred or 
secular matters, is concerned only with actions, and when everyone is allowed to think what they 
wish and to say what they think.”   That goes as well for those in Europe critical of Islam belief 75
as it conduces to radical Islamist action, i.e., acts of religiously motivated terrorism.   
              
Clearly, the UIDHR privileges Islamic doctrine rather than the free thinking an individual may 
pursue on the basis of his or her reason alone.  The right of the sovereign in Muslim majority 
countries and among many Muslims is understood to govern thought as well as action, contrary 
to the positive freedom of philosophical reason such as Spinoza characterizes to be the mandate 
of philosophy.  European countries faced with Muslim immigration are thereby obligated to 
defend freedom of speech as a positive human and civil right protected by the liberal political 
order, without deferring to arguments of political correctness seeking to protect religious 
sensibilities when those sensibilities are insistent on asserting the demands of Islamic political 
order contrary to the fundamental liberties recognized by Western jurisprudence and morality. 
Spinoza’s position on the mandate of philosophy is reasonably advanced thereby, even as 
contemporary philosophically-minded writers of the 20th century such as Derrida and Abū Zayd 
propose consonant rationale for freedom of speech relative to Europe’s encounter with Islam.  To 
do otherwise would be to harm the foundations of European liberal modernity. National security, 
properly understood, is as Spinoza advised: The State is secure when everyone is allowed to 
think what they wish and to say what they think, whatever the medium and venue of free 
expression.  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